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ABSTRACT 
Recent U.S. military engagements in fragile states have focused on building 
security institutions that match Western military and police models. These operations, 
however, have highlighted the need to reevaluate how we build host-nation security 
institutions from the ground up in conflict areas with varying social, religious, and ethnic 
concentrations. The interaction between the environment, doctrine, and technology 
(EDT) provided by U.S. government agencies has complicated the issue by locking the 
host-nation’s success to ongoing U.S. support. This research uses process-tracing to 
examine EDT factors in two case studies: U.S. advisory missions in Vietnam from 1954–
1965, and in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present. These cases are used to analyze past 
and current U.S. efforts aimed at building a partner’s capacity to secure their own 
sovereign territory. Because the current U.S. model for fighting internal threats maintains 
a military structured for fighting external threats, a foreign partner’s security structure 
will likely collapse without continuing U.S. advisory presence and materiel support. 
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I. CAPACITY TO BUILD PARTNERS 
Nearly fifteen years of sustained combat operations since 9/11 have resulted in the 
security transition from U.S. combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to U.S.-trained host-
nation forces. The current struggle between Iraqi security forces and the Islamic State 
(ISIS) has raised questions over the Iraqi military’s ability to defeat ISIS. Similar fears 
for the Afghanistan government’s survival exist as the Taliban postures to regain territory 
after the massive reduction of NATO combat troops at the end of 2014. While most 
research focuses on decisions made in regards to combat operations, less attention has 
been paid to decisions affecting security transition between U.S. forces and host-nation 
forces. The U.S. spent billions of dollars and many lives training, equipping, and 
preparing Iraqis and Afghans to defend their own countries, yet an effective model of 
transitioning authority to partner security forces still remains to be produced. The U.S.-
trained Iraqi military crumbled in the face of an ISIS incursion across the Syrian border 
and the ability of the Afghan Ministry of Defense to defeat the Taliban insurgency is in 
serious doubt. These two cases point to a recurring pattern: the U.S. military’s 
development of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) revolves around mirror-imaging foreign 
security institutions based on U.S. organization and cultural models without considering 
local political and social realities in a given environment. 
A. PURPOSE 
Recent U.S. military engagements in fragile or failed states have focused on 
building security institutions along the organizational framework of western military and 
police models. Failure in these operations seems to underscore the need to reevaluate how 
we build host nation security institutions from the ground up in conflict areas with 
varying social, religious, and ethnic concentrations. This research uses current literature 
and available case studies in building partner capacity (BPC) and counterinsurgency in 
order to analyze the effectiveness of current military doctrine. BPC is an umbrella term 
over various programs ranging from security cooperation, security assistance, foreign 
internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA) to name a few. The purpose of 
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this research is to focus on U.S. military methods for building security forces during 
conflict to identify common features employed when building such forces and analyze 
their effectiveness. This will assist U.S. policy makers and military strategists in 
identifying adaptive ways to build security forces capable of meeting their most likely 
threats. 
Modern operational environments tend to position the military in a dual mission. 
The military’s primary mission is protecting itself through offensive/defensive operations 
aimed at defeating the enemy. The second mission is training FSF to legitimize an 
adequate monopoly of violence great enough to keep an acceptable level of security 
within their respective state.1  The post-9/11 conflict environment highlights the problem 
of ungoverned or poorly governed spaces in which non-state actors (NSAs) can operate 
relatively unhindered. FSF assist U.S. and coalition partners in the current fight against 
NSAs with an ultimate goal of securing their own nation and relieving U.S. and coalition 
force presence. However, the post-Cold War environment increasingly comprises failed 
states with force diffused to a competition of violence between factions, tribes, militias 
and/or terrorists. Competition between these elements presents a significant issue for a 
U.S. military caught between two missions: offensive combat operations against enemy 
combatants and building the capacity of friendly elements to formalize traditional and 
professionalized security force institutions. 
SFA is currently paired with transition doctrine in the U.S. Army’s push to learn 
from mistakes made in Afghanistan and Iraq. Previous policies evoking the statement, 
“you broke it, you own it”2 underscore how some U.S. policy makers view the 
responsibility of re-building a country’s government after the U.S. actively contributes to 
overthrowing it, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The results find the military bogged down 
in a counterinsurgency fight after short-lived initial success leading to slow responses in 
                                                 
1 Robert W. Jackman, Power without Forces: The Political Capacity of Nation-StatesUniversity of 
Michigan Press, 2010), 209, 109–114. 
2 Also known as the “Pottery Barn rule.”  Then secretary of state Colin Powell argued to President 
George W. Bush that an Iraq invasion would dominate his foreign policy and he would “be responsible for 
25 million people in Iraq.,” Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,” 
Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009), 87.    
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re-establishing public services, especially security. The solution to prolonged military 
involvement became partly the establishment of security institutions aimed at securing 
the populace from within and facilitating the responsible exit of foreign military combat 
troops. However, as the U.S. soon found after leaving Iraq in 2011, the hard-fought 
security gains achieved through a military surge, gave way to an onslaught of ISIS 
terrorists easily running through U.S.-equipped and trained Iraqi military and police 
formations. Certainly, U.S. doctrine for building partner capacity requires more thought 
and analysis.   
Examining environments and doctrine alone may miss another crucial aspect that 
has played an ever-increasing role in warfare: technology. As the information age 
continues to affect all aspects of human interaction, all levels of war need to adapt old 
notions of warfare in order to address new exploitations and diffusions of combat 
materiel and tactics. The manner in which the U.S. military equips its partners to secure 
its territory tends to be planned and analyzed poorly prior to execution. The U.S. way of 
war tends to favor mass recruitment and equipping of indigenous personnel to control 
vast areas of land predicated on an extremely outdated conventional concept of fighting 
war. War has changed and technology is a driver for both NSAs and nation states. Recent 
U.S. trends employing technologies must be considered when analyzing FSF 
effectiveness.   
Analyzing these three aspects - environment, doctrine, and technology - and their 
impact on U.S. methods of building FSF capacity is important for current and future U.S. 
strategic objectives. Considering the first of these, U.S. operational environments often 
involve weak national institutions attempting to consolidate power from traditionally held 
local power bases. Second, SFA’s primary function is to build capacity and capability 
into a FSF; however, a misapplication of doctrine by U.S. service members impedes 
creating viable foreign security institutions. Finally, the technology so readily available to 
U.S. combat troops is a double-edged sword when building new militaries from the 
ground up. How does this conventional mindset persist in different environments?  What 
drives current SFA efforts toward conventional solutions?  What technology is feasible, 
practical and enduring for partner nations?  The existing literature is essentially 
 4 
bifurcated between arguments concerning external drivers of security institutions, and 
internal characteristics that facilitate or inhibit such institutions; in the next section, I 
explore this literature, and show our current understanding on these complex topics. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Warfare has evolved throughout history to maximize a group’s efficient use of its 
resources against other groups. The formation of the nation-state focused warfare 
between two sovereign entities, though not excluding conflict between sub-national 
entities and states. The centralization of nation-states coupled with the industrial 
revolution increased the need for standing professional armies as the complexity of 
warfare increased.3  After the Second World War, the U.S. and Soviet Union focused 
their militaries to deter total war, rather than risk an escalation to nuclear war threatening 
global existence. Emerging countries in Africa and Asia fought and won independence 
from colonial powers, which then set the stage for the west (U.S. and Western Europe) 
and the east (Soviet Union and China) to compete for ideological patronage by these 
former colonies. A distinctive characteristic of this shift is that war would compete within 
states among its people, opposed to directly between the nation-states. The focus shifted 
from building a nation-state’s deterrent capability against external competitors to 
supporting allies against internal adversaries in the form of guerrillas, insurgents, or other 
NSAs. The latter increases the need to understand the social construct of a society to 
compete for the support of the population. This distinction gains importance for military 
personnel implementing strategy against both external and internal factors. We will now 
look at each of these factors in turn to better understand the challenges of SFA.   
The premise of realism is that each nation would act in its own self-interest in 
accordance with its own security environment. A state surrounded by enemies, e.g., 
Israel, may have more incentive to rapidly enhance its military technology faster than one 
isolated from external threats, e.g., Costa Rica. In addition, neorealism contends that in a 
competitive and anarchic international system, countries will emulate “best practices” 
                                                 
3 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
1972), 163, 21. 
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that optimize their use of limited resources. In sum, this “externalist” tradition 
emphasizes that forces will be matched rationally against the relevant threats the state 
faces (even, perhaps threats within its borders).4  Others have questioned the rationality 
of using external examples, or models, to emulate “best practices.”  DiMaggio and 
Powell explain, “When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals 
are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may 
model themselves on other organizations.”5  Modeling, as DiMaggio and Powell use it, is 
how organizations deal with uncertainty. In the realm of international politics, Farrell 
focuses on norm transplantation, which is the implementation of international norms into 
new national constructs.6  Farrell examines the international norms of military 
professionals and their preference for conventional warfare and civilian authority over the 
military.7 These preferences for conventional warfare and civilian authority can be forced 
on weaker states from external actors requiring the transformation of the weaker state’s 
internal dynamics. The focus on external arguments then turns to examining how internal 
environments react to these external pressures.    
 “Internal” arguments focus on the attributes of the host polity and society – 
noting that the institutions and culture of the nation may determine the types of doctrine, 
military technology, and force structure the nation might adopt. Barry Posen emphasizes 
two important factors nations consider when choosing military doctrine; means and the 
manner those means are employed.8  Military choices for doctrine and technology may 
have a-rational drivers. Military isomorphism, for example, contends that actors may 
emulate techniques that are not appropriate (serve little rational function) because such 
techniques bestow some aura of power or professionalism. Under such “security 
imaginary,” security environments are not objectively determined, but interpreted 
                                                 
4 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
5 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 
eds. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 69. 
6 Theo Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional 
Army,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001), 65. 
7 Ibid., 73. 
8 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 244, 13. 
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through self-imposed identities and their interactions with the environment.9 These 
arguments focus on what drives the nation and its forces to choose specific techniques or 
technology to seek or value. Second, mismatches between military forms and local 
culture will retard or forestall successful adoption. Theo Farrell adds that Western 
militaries are ingrained in their organizational structure, culture, and methods, which they 
have invested time and effort, making operational change difficult.10  Emily Goldman’s 
work on the diffusion of military techniques provides a useful framework for informing 
the problem. She defines military diffusion as the process of elites employing new 
technologies, processes and methods into their state’s institutions and practices.11  
Military diffusion is not solely concerned with advanced weaponry, but with the 
processing of new information to alter its security institution. Her work emphasizes the 
degree to which military technologies, doctrine, and structures fit or misfit with target 
nations.    
Conversely, countries less developed than their western contemporaries often find 
security roles delegated to groups uncontrolled by centralized authority. Ahram argues 
the internal and external threat environment heavily influences the “devolution of 
security” from centralized state authorities to paramilitary groups.12  Matt Dearing 
analyzes the varying degree of violence promulgated by paramilitaries against 
communities they reside during Afghanistan’s state formation period beginning after the 
U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.13  Dearing examines the relationships between 
paramilitaries and their patron/s, local governance structure, incentives, and how all relate 
with one another to determine why some paramilitaries are more violent than others. He 
                                                 
9 Joelien Pretorius, “The Security Imaginary: Explaining Military Isomorphism,” Security Dialogue 
39, no. 1 (2008), 99–120. 
10 Theo Farrell, “Introduction: Military Adaptation in War,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 
eds. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 1–
23. 
11 Emily O. Goldman, “Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion,” Review of International Studies 
32, no. 01 (2006), 69. 
12 Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 4–5. 
13 Matthew P. Dearing, “The Dogs of War: Paramilitary Groups and State Formation in Afghanistan” 
(Ph.D. diss, Naval Postgraduate School), 6. 
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concludes that paramilitary group behavior is most dependent on its relationship with 
local communities in which they reside. The patron/client relationship (paramilitaries as 
the client and individual or organization sponsor as patron) which places community 
oversight on paramilitary actions are more likely to lead to protective rather than 
predatory behavior.14  Bridging the local polity with the paramilitary force requires a 
certain degree of trust not commonly in large supply during times of state formation, 
especially after long periods of internal conflict. However, as Henk suggests, shared 
values and behaviors that tie common understanding about mutual rights and 
responsibilities rests strongest in the smallest and most proximate groups.15   
We can now turn from theoretical treatments to existing policy and doctrine 
applications. United States doctrine on training FSF contains a myriad of terms aimed to 
merge the various agencies of government into a unified effort. BPC is an umbrella term 
first presented in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) aiming to bridge the gap 
between the various executive departments with authority over assisting FSF.16  The term 
highlights the government’s goal to strengthen security institutions in failed or weak 
states intended to strengthen national security interests.17  However, as the congressional 
research service notes, “neither the policy nor academic communities have explored in 
great detail whether or not Building Partner Capacity works to achieve U.S. strategic 
objectives.”18  In the 2010 QDR, the Obama administration backed its predecessor in 
placing SFA as an increasingly critical element of security cooperation under BPC.19  
According to the recently released Field Manual for Security Cooperation, FM 3-22, 
“For over 100 years, providing advisors or training assistance to partner security forces 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 286. 
15 Dan Henk, “Human Security: Relevance and Implications,” Parameters (Summer, 2005), 9 
December 2015, 101. 
16 Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, What is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for 
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015). 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Ibid., 1. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
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has been the rule, not the exception for the Army.”20  However, the manner in which they 
train partner security forces has changed. Regionally aligned forces (RAF) provide 
geographic combatant commanders (GCC) with a tailorable force up to a Joint Task 
Force headquarters (Modular Brigade) to shape the security environment in accordance 
with the GCC theater security cooperation plan. RAFs aim to enhance the cultural, 
language, geographic and military knowledge of its Service Members to deploy adaptable 
trainers with “local” knowledge of the host nation partner they intend to train. 
Additionally, with this new arrangement, SFA is embedded into the possible mission sets 
RAFs will execute, to include training military, paramilitary, police, intelligence, and 
other forces.21 
A similar mission set, usually performed by United States Special Operations 
Forces (USSOF), FID, mirrors SFA, but is distinguishable by doctrine. FID encompasses 
both civilian and military institutions working with a foreign government aimed to 
protect against internal subversive and terrorist threats. SFA is solely concerned with 
training FSF, not only for internal threats, but for external threats with the ability to join a 
multinational coalition.22  The development of security forces is not only touted as an 
Army global imperative for the last century, but the hallmark for working towards 
transitioning combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent revisions in the U.S. 
Army’s FM 3-07 Stability have placed emphasis on SFA that enables the military to 
transition from post-conflict. An entire chapter is dedicated to emphasizing the necessity, 
urgency, and complexity of conducting transition. Transition can occur at all levels of 
war, at different phases of an operation, and can occur more than once. For purposes of 
this paper, “transitions include transferring authority and control to other military forces, 
civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation.”23  Establishing Civil Security, 
which may include SFA aims to create “a safe, secure, and stable environment…key to 
                                                 
20 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 21, 2013), V. 
21 Ibid., 1–10. 
22 Ibid., 1–11. 
23 U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of the Army, June 2, 2014), 2–4. 
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obtaining local support for military operations” and necessary for transitioning 
authority.24 This doctrinal framework continues to establish the idea of professionalism 
and international human rights principles as key requirements for FSF prior to executing 
a transition of U.S. forces to an advisory role. Yet, ideals of professionalism in failed 
states require more than promotion from Western forces, and set the tone for complicated 
relationships as “professionalized” training commences. Doctrine is vague in its 
definition of these terms, and provides little to force planners conducting full spectrum 
operations in fragile states.       
RAND published a thorough accounting of security partnerships in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.25  RAND recommended several actions for both U.S. and NATO Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) to implement in future partner capacity building missions. First, 
SOF needs to balance their operations between building partner capacity and combat. 
Second, building capacity focused on combat proficiency ignores sustainment and 
support activities required to equip, regenerate, and maintain FSF. Technological 
advances and economic sustainment were both severely lacking to support the level of 
training coalition SOF conducted with Afghan security forces (ASF). However, the study 
says little about the force structure implemented by coalition forces at the national level, 
effecting host nation internal security. The amount of coalition support, especially in 
regards to logistics, is a primary source for slow host nation improvement over time. 
Nothing in the study assessed the feasibility of Western, U.S.-style military structure with 
historical foreign security models. 
Moving beyond isolating one aspect involved in the outcome of building partner 
capacity, the interaction of multiple factors applies for this research. One factor alone is 
not adequate in explaining how so much effort and resources applied to strengthening 
partner security repeatedly falls short. Nor is it adequate to assume that all situations the 
U.S. intends to build partner capacity require theoretically based solutions. However, 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 1–2. 
25 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: 
Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015).  
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tracing the factors believed to affect U.S. efforts in building partner capacity contributes 
to understanding its value in the present context.   
C. RESEARCH GOAL 
The goal of this research is to trace the causal effects of the environment, 
doctrine, and technology on U.S. efforts to build appropriate forces as a prerequisite to 
meeting U.S. strategic objectives. The research intends to explain how each factor; 
environment, doctrine, and technology (EDT) directly influence the nature, and outcome 
of assisting FSF development and show how the three factors interact with each other 
during execution. Using the cases of the Vietnam War and Operation Enduring Freedom, 
this thesis will trace how and why the U.S. military has been unsuccessful at building 
partner capacity in FSF. The U.S. bureaucratic construct fails to adapt to a changed 
battlefield, with adversaries no longer adhering to the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), 
which likewise strain U.S. efforts to fight effectively against an enemy bent on defeating 
western militaries through attrition by exploiting their weaknesses, which Western 
militaries are unwilling to adapt. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodological technique utilized in this project is process-tracing of key 
variables in chosen case studies. Beach and Pedersen define theory-building process 
tracing as a procedure “to detect a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is 
linked with Y.26  George and Bennett further argue that “because these observations must 
be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case…process-tracing…is 
frequently valuable in theory development.27  The interaction between the operational 
environment, military doctrine, and the technology employed in the case studies 
examined (Vietnam and Afghanistan) creates the framework for analysis of the casual 
mechanism between U.S. structured FSF and failure to successfully transition security 
                                                 
26 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pederson, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 16. 
27 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 207–209. 
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responsibility to FSF ownership. Vietnam and Afghanistan were chosen because, in both 
cases, a small U.S. advisory presence to build host-nation security institutions resulted in 
greater U.S. military intervention. This study argues the three factors, EDT, interact with 
each other in a manner that becomes counterproductive over time resulting from failures 
in adapting operational initiatives to operational realities. Previous studies focus on how 
these variables affect U.S. military effectiveness; this work adds to the field of study on 
military effectiveness by looking at the effectiveness of partner security forces as they 
emulate U.S. security models. By tracing out the dynamics of these factors, insights into 
building FSF can be generated that will guide future research and policy. 
1. Environmental Factors 
A weak state is weak in part because it lacks the bureaucratic institutions 
normally associated with distributing resources from the government to its people. The 
strength or weakness of the security institution will determine how FSF respond to threats 
externally and internally. The development of weak states, or lack thereof, can lead to a 
further deterioration of internal security if incentives exist to keep power diffused rather 
than building appropriate bureaucratic institutions necessary to manage the country’s 
resources. Reno studies the impact of what he calls the “shadow state” in his study of 
warlord politics in African countries.28 The shadow state involves patron networks 
established by rulers to receive support externally, and in turn uses that support to 
manage internal patronage networks to tie potential adversaries to their rule. Bueno de 
Mesquita argues these non-democratic governments lack incentives for developing public 
security.29  These works highlight the difficulty and complexity of establishing legitimate 
security institutions in a failed or fractured state—the task may not only involve the 
inherent challenge of funding and training forces, but it may also face multiple layers of 
strategic actors who benefit from the task failing.   
                                                 
28 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Pienner, 1998), 227, 2. 
29 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2003). 
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In both cases, I will trace how the chief executive manages sovereign power, and 
how this power affects government institutions aimed at securing its population. 
Legitimate power incentivizes cooperation among members of society to act as the chief 
executive directs. However, political and social friction can lead to competition among 
local rulers. If security is among the primary concerns of rulers, how do they fail to 
interpret adequate security responses to growing internal problems?  How does external 
patronage affect internal processes of organizing security institutions?         
2. Doctrinal Factors 
U.S. military doctrine in contested environments seems to fit the hypothesis that 
the U.S. way of war has changed little over the last century, though the threats emerging 
during this time have changed. After the First World War, a desire to codify principles in 
the military emerged, due to perceived lack of scientific methods of conducting war, 
leading to the mass stalemate experienced along the Western Front. These principles 
developed by the War department in 1921 created the first formal list of the “Principles 
of War.”30  These principles, to include offensive, mass, and economy of force, helped to 
engrain the “conventional” style of combat preferred by Western militaries for several 
generations leading to Vietnam. Adhering to set rules of war dilutes critical thinking and 
provides a false assumption that responses using “principled” solutions are sound. 
Adamsky argues, “American mental formations favor procedural knowledge, which 
focuses on how to get things done, in contrast to descriptions of the way things are.”31  
Mass, conventional units with large logistics supply chains swarm the operational area 
and establish semi-permanent operating bases from which to project coercive force. This 
gradual build-up eventually leads the U.S. military to establish FSF in an identical U.S. 
image, imparting the techniques, which have served the U.S. military since WWII. 
Brooks evaluates doctrine as it relates across all levels of war, and how they mutually 
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31 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 231. 
 13 
support one another, creating integration: a primary element in military effectiveness.32  
The U.S. doctrine of employing force results from several factors including military 
organizational design and military institutional culture. Krepinevich argues that Special 
Forces originally deployed to Vietnam to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) rather 
than counterinsurgency (COIN), because UW operations, opposed to COIN operations, 
supported conventional operations.33  This mindset focused efforts on building guerilla 
forces over defeating insurgents. Recent developments over the last half century, such as 
employing a highly professionalized force create a U.S. tendency to export its security 
design to other states, regardless of their environment. Brooks argues, “a responsive 
military is one that adjusts its operational doctrine and tactics to exploit its adversary’s 
weaknesses and its own strengths.”34  However, Posen states, “changing doctrines takes 
time; it disorients a military organization.”35  Exploring the history and culture of 
doctrine used throughout the case studies will help analyze the effectiveness of the 
doctrine imposed by the U.S. military on the partner nation.   
I intend to study how the initial strategic objectives of U.S. advisors affected the 
doctrine employed by both U.S. combat personnel and U.S. advisors. Furthermore, do the 
doctrines vary between the two cases, and why/why not?  How do security forces 
interpret their operational environment?  Were aspects of professionalism altered to 
account for social differences in each case?   
3. Technological Capabilities 
After WWII, the U.S. competed with the Soviet Union for military technological 
dominance, in a global battle to maintain and increase their respective spheres of 
influence. During 1945–1965, the arms race produced the accompanying technological 
expertise and bureaucratic organization required to acquire, coordinate and supervise its 
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production across varying academic and professional fields of study.36 After the Soviet 
Union’s collapse ended the Cold War, a revolution in military affairs aimed to exploit 
technology “that could destroy the enemy with pinpoint accuracy from great distances 
while minimizing the exposure to U.S. forces to enemy fire.”37  The U.S. military 
dominance in the First Gulf War from its technological hegemony set the course in the 
1990s for increased reliance on precision guidance weapon systems and less Service 
Members to employ it on the battlefield. A nation harnesses its materiel quality and the 
skill of its military members, including their motivations, to help increase its own 
effectiveness.38 However, the harnessing of technological dominance in war is not the 
sole indicator of effectiveness where it predicts victory or defeat. As Van Creveld notes, 
“the conduct of war against an intelligent opponent differs from the management of a 
large-scale technological system” underlying the difference between military 
effectiveness and efficiency.39   
Culminating with Donald Rumsfeld’s Military Transformation model of smaller, 
highly specialized and equipped forces leading the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
after 9/11, underscores the importance in analyzing how technology influences BPC in 
failed/failing states. Underdeveloped nations possess fewer advanced means to wage war, 
therefore have fewer personnel with adequate education required to employ advanced 
means. Economists use the term “absorptive capacity” referring to the process of 
transforming aid (input) received to useful programs (output) to reduce poverty.40  U.S. 
vulnerabilities fighting insurgencies highlight the need to relook U.S. military reliance on 
technology to strike a balance between necessity and appropriateness. In prolonged wars 
involving counterinsurgencies, Korb and Ogden argue, “the United States’ impressive 
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technology cannot substitute for soldiers.”41  The technology we provide FSF must also 
account for a partner’s absorptive capacity. The planner/searcher argument adequately 
frames the utility of foreign aid, which argues that planners tend to follow “blueprints” on 
aid programs, whereas searches employ solutions based on local realities.42  Local 
realities are discovered through prerequisite partnerships built between the providers and 
the recipients of aid, but must work beyond this simple generalization. This sentiment is 
echoed by a report analyzing U.S. foreign assistance, which states partnership “reflect 
relationships…among peers, where priorities are mutual, effort is mutual, and 
accountability is mutual.”43   
Examining the relationship between reliance of combat systems while building 
partner capacity immediately brings forward two questions. What kind of capabilities can 
we expect to export to foreign security partners and how do these systems affect these 
security forces within their operational environment?  Does too much reliance on external 
support hinder development of FSF or create dependency?       
4. Framing the Factors in the Casual Mechanism 
This study attempts to study the interrelated factors involved when the U.S. 
attempts to build partner capacity in a fragile environment. The U.S. military hopes to 
build security forces to achieve strategic objectives to prevent prolonged interventions in 
foreign nations. The failures in the post-Cold War era is due to the interaction of factors 
including the ignorance of operational environments, inappropriate doctrine and an over-
reliance on technological materiel, that is then modeled to build FSF ill-suited for its 
environment and adversary. Beach and Pederson state, “mechanismic understandings of 
causality is the dynamic, interactive influence of causes on outcomes and in particular 
how causal forces are transmitted through the series of interlocking parts of a causal 
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mechanism to contribute to producing an outcome.”44  The framework for the following 
case studies follows the pattern of environment, doctrine, and technology. These factors 
interact with one another to create partnerships that mimic the U.S. military. The case 
studies for this research examine the U.S. Advisory mission in Vietnam prior to massive 
military mobilization in 1965 and the U.S. advisory mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 
the present. Using the framework in these case studies allows testing of the hypothesis 
that the U.S. exports its brand of security regardless of the operational environment, 
which affects the doctrine taught to FSF and an overreliance on technology with little 
analysis to its utility to produce security. These practices harm U.S. strategic goals to 
build lasting host nation security aimed to prevent large U.S. military intervention over 
extended periods in order to conduct internal security operations for the host nation. 
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II. CASE STUDY: VIETNAM ADVISORY YEARS: 1954–1964 
Vietnam plays a pivotal role in U.S. military history. The Viet Cong insurgency 
inside South Vietnam, and the U.S. military’s inability to combat against it, brought 
military, civilian, and academic leaders alike to spend the post-Vietnam years 
contemplating what went wrong. The overwhelming buildup of U.S. forces in 1965, led 
to the U.S. intervening in a conflict -in a major way- it never intended to involve itself 
with.   BPC was not an official policy term during the advisory years; however, it is 
exactly what the U.S. strategy aimed to accomplish during that time. U.S. advisors sent to 
Vietnam provided materiel and advisory support to a developing South Vietnamese army, 
in an environment fractured by its war of independence from French colonial rule, and 
struggling to build national identity. Theories have proliferated to present day on causes 
leading to U.S. withdrawal in 1973, and the subsequent fall of South Vietnam in 1975. 
The focus of this case study is the advisory effort that failed to prevent U.S. intervention 
in 1965. 
This chapter will establish the background of U.S. presence in Vietnam, followed 
by discussion on EDT factors. The case will show how these factors create the casual 
mechanism in building FSF in a mirror image of U.S. security models, inadequate for 
internal security. Each factor is discussed separately and chronologically within each 
factor. Finally, a conclusion draws on the interaction between EDT factors as it relates to 
the case study. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
After World War II, the French attempted to regain their influence in Vietnam 
where they had colonial ties dating back to the later 19th century. Vietnamese nationalists, 
called the Viet Minh, opposed Japanese and French occupation with aims of unifying 
Vietnam as one country. After the Japanese surrender and subsequent Chinese 
withdrawal, France fought a strengthening Viet Minh force up until the calamitous defeat 
of French forces at Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the nationalists. The following Geneva 
agreement partitioned the country at the 17th Parallel, separating the Viet Minh-controlled 
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north from the French supported government led by Emperor Bao Dai in the south.45  
Fearing the spread of communism across Southeast Asia if the Viet Minh took control of 
the entire country, the Eisenhower administration committed financial support to French 
advisory efforts. The U.S. intended to re-establish the Vietnamese Army through the 
Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG).46  By 1965, three U.S. presidents 
managed the efforts to build a viable security institution to stabilize the south and deter 
aggression by the north. However, because of the lack of historical and social 
understanding in Vietnamese affairs, a slow adapting doctrine to deal with COIN, and a 
military and police structure built on Western ideals, U.S. intervention plunged its 
military and people into the most controversial war to date. 
B. ENVIRONMENT 
In 1954, the United States had just ended the Korean War the previous year in 
stalemate prior to the French requesting assistance in training the Vietnamese Army. 
Senior U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower, were skeptical over the program’s 
ability to produce a viable deterrent threat for Indochina. The threat of nuclear weapons 
was used to deter Chinese aggression; however, it was unlikely the U.S. would truly 
consider massive retaliation if North Vietnam decided to invade the south. Viet Minh 
supporters and competing sects, including the more powerful Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao 
sects controlled pockets of South Vietnam’s rural areas. These sects contained their own 
security forces financed through the French. Finally, the Binh Xuyen, an enterprise 
bankrolling profits from running casinos, brothels, and opium dens, controlled the Saigon 
police.47 These groups did not hold official positions within Emperor Bao Dai’s 
government, but received patronage by lining the pockets of Bao Dai, continuing the 
legacy of French influence. Rising through the ranks of Vietnamese government, Ngo 
Dinh Diem became the Prime Minister at Emperor Bao Dai’s request, attributed more to 
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the lack of alternative options than a desire to have Diem fill the vacancy.48  Diem was 
an avowed Catholic whom Bao Dai chose to face the communist threat from the north. 
The competing sections of power, as well as a formidable Viet Minh presence in the 
countryside persuaded U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles to support U.S. military efforts 
to rebuild a national Vietnamese Army in support of Diem’s government. As the U.S. 
contemplated the level and depth of U.S. support in building the Vietnamese Army, Diem 
attempted to consolidate power using bribery and force to neutralize opposition from 
competing sects, and exert his control over the national army.    
Prior to accepting Bao Dai’s request to be Prime Minister, Diem required 
complete control over civilian and military affairs.49  Early in 1955, the Diem 
government used the Army to reoccupy former Viet Minh strongholds designed as 
regroupment zones by the Geneva convention. Diem and U.S. advisors understood the 
importance of filling the vacuum and established accelerated programs to incorporate 
civil affairs and psychological operations into Vietnamese occupation plans. Though 
these operations were successful, they failed to make enduring effects on the population 
where the Viet Minh had successfully left behind an underground cadre for future 
subversion against Diem’s government.50   
Complicating future issues with Viet Minh supporters living covertly in South 
Vietnamese villages were the poor administrative capabilities at all levels of the Diem 
government. Diem’s ruling qualities followed the “Personalist” philosophy of striking 
balance between individual, society, and state needs.51  His authoritarian methods 
stemmed from his view that democracy was slow to implement reforms and unable to 
thwart subversion. Most village administrators were holdovers from the French colonial 
era, carrying over bad habits, like laziness or corruption from colonial subjugation to 
outside authority. Diem’s previous exile in 1950 stymied creation of close confidants, 
leading the way for him to draw on close familial ties to occupy key government 
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positions.52  After winning a referendum in October 1955, Diem became head of state 
deposing Bao Dai and declaring Vietnam a republic.53  Diem’s strict grip on political 
power from the national level down to individual villages ensured his control over the 
country’s political power structure, but created both domestic and foreign opponents.   
The Eisenhower administration viewed Diem as an avid anti-communist 
nationalist; however, concerns over the lack of democratic progress in South Vietnam 
began surfacing among civilian leaders. Diem rejected initial reforms proposed by U.S. 
advisors, because he refused to centralize security and intelligence services.54  Keeping 
the armed services decentralized within the government dislodged potential opponents to 
Diem’s government from consolidating enough power to commit a coup. U.S. officials 
failed to understand that Diem persistently ensured his rule continued. Keeping family 
members and close confidants in key governmental positions and bureaucrats from 
consolidating police and military power kept Diem in power. An unintended consequence 
was the poor development of security forces, upsetting its effective management. 
By 1963, Diem had successfully consolidated power, thwarting military coups 
attempts, marginalizing opponents, and strengthening programs aimed to provide rural 
communities the resources needed to fight communist subversion and extend Saigon’s 
reach to the Hamlets. A seemingly innocent protest in May 1963 would change the fate of 
Diem and South Vietnam as a whole. A law passed by the Diem regime banned the flying 
of flags in public; however, the law came after an event where South Vietnamese 
Catholics had waved flags of the Roman Catholic Church, thereby giving the perception 
of a governmental bias towards other religions. Buddhists, who comprised a large portion 
of the country, responded with open defiance to the law, waving Buddhist flags during a 
holiday celebration in Hue. Local security responses lead to violent clashes leaving nine 
Buddhists dead, and conflicting reports on how and why the deaths occurred, though it 
was apparent that South Vietnamese Soldiers had fired into the protesting crowd. 
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Buddhist leader, Tri Quang, subsequently led protests throughout the summer with 
increasing calls for liberalization of the South Vietnamese government and the removal 
of Diem. Under pressure from U.S. State Department personnel, Diem made concessions 
to appease Buddhist complaints, much to his loathing. Concessions of any amount did not 
placate the opponents who wished to see a regime change. U.S. ambassadors up to this 
time pushed Diem toward liberalizing more of his government as Diem pushed back, 
continually citing cultural differences between U.S. democracy and the social fabric 
wielding control in South Vietnam. Ideology was not a source of power over the people 
in Vietnam, but strong leadership and military power.55 
Viewing the current unrest as an opportunity for regime change, a military coup 
ousted Diem from power. Assassinated by his men, mild chaos ensued over the next 
several months as loyalties were tested, resulting in another military coup between 
military generals in January 1964. By this time, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had 
taken office following President John F. Kennedy’s assassination three weeks following 
Diem’s demise. Johnson now faced a situation where little public support existed for 
military actions in Vietnam, coupled with a pending presidential election to remain in 
office at the end of the year. A second coup in South Vietnam in almost as many months 
prompted the administration to send Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor to ascertain the ground 
situation inside Vietnam.56  They found the Vietnamese Army facing more desertions, 
and the Viet Cong gaining ground as they increased their attacks in the rural areas. 
McNamara advised a slight increase in support to bolster South Vietnam’s budget, which 
Johnson approved.   
In August 1964, the USS Maddox was attacked off the coast of North Vietnam in 
international waters. Two nights later, a second attack on the Maddox and another 
accompanying ship, the USS Turner Joy, prompted a swift and nearly unanimous 
decision by Congress, granting the President authority to take necessary action, as he 
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deemed adequate to protect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.57  Attacks by the Viet Cong 
would increase, killing five Americans at Bien Hoa air base and two Americans during a 
U.S. housing attack in Saigon.58 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the authority that led 
to a new phase of the war in 1965, when introduction of conventional combat troops 
commenced combat operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular army 
units.     
C. DOCTRINE 
The structure of the military created a point of contention between Western 
advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts. As the American advisory role gradually 
replaced the French, plans capped South Vietnam’s military at 100,000 soldiers due to 
budget availability, as well as U.S./French advisor dependence on the French 
Expeditionary Corps (FEC) to provide the bulk of security deterrence. American civilian 
authority viewed the Vietnamese requirement for internal security, where the Vietnamese 
regarded them as an instrument defending against external aggression, particularly from 
the North.59  The American view stemmed from the belief that the FEC would handle 
any external aggression. Complicating the civilian view was the implementation of their 
desired end state by U.S. military advisors who were in charge of bringing policy to 
action.   Lieutenant General John O’Daniel, the MAAG commander through the end of 
1955, desired to build the Vietnamese Army using “American methods and concepts,” 
which included building “training facilities, a command and general staff college, an 
amphibious training center and a specialist training center.”60  In addition, Vietnamese 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) would attend training schools in the U.S. 
After the French completely cut ties to Vietnam, the FEC no longer served the deterrent 
option against North Vietnam. O’Daniel organized Vietnamese battalions into divisions 
to consolidate training efforts and improve their external threat capabilities. Diem did not 
favor O’Daniel’s method because he felt many battalions at the time were spread out in 
                                                 
57 Sharp, Strategy for Defeat., 45–46. 
58 Ibid., 48–55. 
59 Spector, Advice and Support, 263. 
60 Ibid., 222. 
 23 
the rural villages aimed at combating subversive activities launched by holdovers of the 
Viet Minh. General O’Daniel believed that by consolidating battalions into four field 
divisions, six light divisions, and 13 territorial regiments for regional security, the Army 
would be able to meet both internal and external threats.61  His confidence in the concept 
of regional regiments opposing internal threats allowed him and his successors to 
continue conventional planning for an external invasion from North Vietnam. This is 
apparent in his replacement, General Sam Williams, who viewed strategy through a 
Korean War lens. Williams viewed COIN operations more suitable for local militias than 
armies, with Diem making strides to implement such a strategy. 
Striking the balance between internal and external threats, Diem utilized 
stationary militias to guard villages called the self-defense corps (SDC), while 
establishing militias more mobile to protect entire districts, named the civil guard (CG).62  
These forces were initially a cost effective way to fill the gaps between the Army 
battalions, and free them to consolidate against a North Vietnamese Army invasion; the 
more traditional military role. President Eisenhower advocated the development of 
foreign internal security forces in countries like Vietnam, facing severe subversive 
communist threats. However, unlike his military commanders in the MAAG, his policy 
directives focused solely on internal security through police and paramilitary actions.63  
Michigan State University police mentors, contracted by the U.S. government, provided 
training to the CG, because the Eisenhower administration’s international police 
assistance program lacked enough trained and qualified officials within the International 
Cooperation Agency in charge of the effort. Therefore, contracting this requirement left 
university social scientists tasked with improving “badly led, ill-equipped, and poorly 
trained internal security units.”64  Controversy over the CG’s equipping and mandate 
between Diem and the Michigan State advisors exemplified the American style of 
thinking at odds with Vietnamese culture. Diem wanted the CG under the authority of the 
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military in order to replace ineffective leaders as quickly and efficiently as possible, and 
to have the ability to arm the units with appropriate weapons such as automatic rifles and 
mortars. The Michigan State advisors viewed the CG as a police force, advocating for the 
use of batons and pistols over military style automatic weapons. The advisors viewed the 
police as they viewed American policing, as apolitical and meant to protect and serve 
against criminals.65  They failed to understand that the police served to protect Diem’s 
regime, not the people. The clash over police roles bled into other aspects meant to 
improve internal security. 
Training further magnified the peculiar differences between U.S. and Vietnamese 
interoperability. The language barrier between U.S. advisors and their Vietnamese 
counterparts played a debilitating role. The limited personnel available to MAAG 
prevented adequate attention overseeing actual training, instead spending time translating 
manuals from English to Vietnamese. The average number of U.S. advisors with 
Vietnamese language training from 1956–1959 was 12.66  Program costs prevented any 
chance of improving this statistic, especially due to the size of the MAAG compared to 
budgetary requirements across the Army. Language deficiency was the symptom of 
broader educational gaps for U.S. Officers assigned to MAAG, which further lacked 
trained officers in Vietnamese cultural and history prior to their assignment. Additionally, 
the advisory group leaned heavily on one year, unaccompanied tours without family 
members. Optimism replaced objective assessments, arguably because of the small 
advisory footprint, and potential fears that scrutiny would befall the advisor if no 
improvements materialized during each tour.67  Not much different from the problems 
faced in modern, rotational military deployments, whether for combat or training, it 
degrades the relationships between the advisor and the advised. Vietnamese officers 
learned quickly how to deal with their American counterparts, where U.S. advisors spent 
the first few months learning all the particulars about their assigned duties and that of 
their counterpart.    
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The election of President Kennedy brought a new theory of international relations 
in dealing with the Third World. Kennedy was a proponent of modernization theory, 
stressing the most important method for countering communist subversive threats in the 
Third World was to empower state institutions. Protecting these institutions, while 
representing the state, was a responsibility of local police and paramilitary forces, for 
which Kennedy believed U.S Army Special Forces (SF) as the appropriate organization 
to train and advise.68  Opponents within the military viewed SF as contrary to the Army’s 
primary goal of fighting conventional, division based war. SF established in 1952, were 
authorized as part of the Army’s Psychological Warfare component, but required 
championing by President Kennedy ten years later forcing the Army leadership to 
embrace them into the UW and COIN role.69  Kennedy rejected Eisenhower’s massive 
retaliation policy, believing smaller, limited war theory as a more palpable option to 
influence the Third World, and embraced the SF ability to work with guerrilla fighters. 
However, the concept of COIN meant to pacify rural areas and bring them under friendly 
government control. UW was on the opposite of the special warfare spectrum aimed at 
organizing, training, and equipping guerrilla fighters against the government or 
occupying regime. The UW methods SF used were now the activities SF would try to 
defend against itself and South Vietnam.   
D. TECHNOLOGY  
The prevailing theme from the time the U.S. took control building the South 
Vietnamese Army was to transport U.S. military institutions and training methodologies 
and implement them into building South Vietnam’s security. Not surprisingly, the United 
States stuck to the Pacific War doctrine, recently tested against Japan and revalidated in 
Korea. Immediately upon the French withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam after 
the U.S. officially supported Diem over Emperor Bao Dai’s insistence for regime change 
by French surrogates, the South Vietnamese Army faced its first crisis; logistics. Under 
the French, the Vietnamese Army design placed them in support of the FEC giving them 
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almost no organic sustainment capability.70  Exacerbating the issue was the abundance of 
equipment supplied since 1950 through U.S. materiel assistance exceeding the capacity 
of the Vietnamese Army. The internal threats from opposing sects and the Binh Xuyen 
coupled with the external threat of invasion from the North made Diem and his Generals 
hesitant to reduce the amount of “unnecessary” equipment to ease the logistics burden.71  
The immediate response to handle the situation was to deploy U.S. logistics personnel to 
Vietnam in order to train the Vietnamese on American supply management techniques.   
General O’Daniel, the first MAAG Commander, intended to tailor the divisions to 
meet the environment in Vietnam. Though he wanted to maintain doctrinal principals of 
military organization around the division concept, he opted to lighten the load of 
Vietnamese divisions, equipping them with more light machine guns and a comparable 
amount of mortar systems as U.S. divisions maintained.72  Reliance on firepower, 
especially field artillery would be the lynchpin the South Vietnamese Army would pivot 
towards to compensate for manpower shortages and budget constraints that was 
outmatched by the north. General Williams intended to continue O’Daniel’s vision of 
countering both the internal subversive threat, while deterring Northern aggression. 
However, he found that the Diem regime placed inadequate divisional and regional 
commanders in positions higher than their capability allowed. Most did not understand 
how to plan or implement indirect fires and were solely occupying their command billets 
because of their close ties to President Diem. Diem complicated the issue by pushing his 
plan to reorganize the O’Daniel concept to accommodate “larger and more heavily 
armed…U.S.-type formations.”73  Desiring to maintain current troop levels while 
increasing the combat support and sustainment capabilities, seven infantry divisions of 
10,450 men took the place of the light and field divisions. Vehicles introduced a way to 
bring logistics forward to lighter armed foot soldiers operating at the front in the jungles 
and mountains. Diem spent large amounts of money to improve road systems in the 
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densely vegetated Central Highlands in order to facilitate mobility. However, as the 
situation in the late 1950s played out, the subversion that was once at the forefront of 
Diem’s main concern as a threat against his government intensified, turning his attention 
to outfitting the CG and SDC to meet that threat. 
American and Vietnamese officials once believed that conventional army 
formations could defeat both external and internal threats. The fact that too few South 
Vietnamese existed to protect the thousands of villages spread across South Vietnam led 
to a Vietnamese plan to bolster the new CG aimed at taking the static position of defense 
in these rural areas. Diem’s plan called for heavy armament including tanks and 
helicopters, which unsurprisingly incensed American advisors, including General 
Williams. The original plan devised by the advisory group called for a modest arming of 
10,000 men with M1 carbines and browning automatic rifles; Second World War era 
weapons, but nonetheless still effective for local security. The difference between the 
American and Vietnamese plans underscored the issue of building partner capacity 
between a superpower and budding nation-state. Not until suspicions about Diem’s 
motivation for requesting such extravagant weapon systems for a local defense force, 
Williams learned a Vietnamese General devised the plan opting to simply copy the 
military table of organization and equipment of a U.S. armored division for 
convenience.74 Williams protested CG training by police advisors rather than military 
advisors, and was able to move the CG to the Defense Ministry in 1960.75  Interagency 
fighting over the role of the CG affected their ability to receive resources and equipment, 
as officials prioritized the military forces to receive aid. U.S. military aid did not provide 
funds for the CG or SDC prior to 1962, and through 1965, received only 20% of military 
aid provided for the internal security of South Vietnam.76      
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E. CONCLUSION 
After the United States took over responsibility for aiding the development of the 
South Vietnamese government from the French in 1955, U.S. efforts were already 
disadvantaged. Viet Minh holdovers south of the 17th Parallel, coupled with a vast rural 
population disconnected from a fledgling government in Saigon in 1954, helped sow the 
seeds for insurgency three years later. Diem became a strong advocate against 
communism, but simultaneously motivated to sustain his rule. Focusing efforts to 
centralize power included placing his supporters in positions of authority, and ensuring 
the country’s military, paramilitary, and police forces were decentralized in order to 
prevent opponents from consolidating power against him. The oppression of varying 
political, religious and social sects worried U.S. officials who pushed increasing 
democratic reforms on Diem, but were unwilling to use financial and materiel aid as 
leverage.   
The MAAG took logical steps to bolster South Vietnam’s military force structure 
to deter another Korean like experience, fresh in the minds of senior military advisors 
sent to Vietnam. The U.S. experience in Korea focused its efforts in building a 
conventional deterrent to external aggression from the north, and as the subversion 
increased internally from Viet Minh supporters, police and paramilitary units were 
created to secure the rural populace. Funding these efforts were disjointed between the 
various departments of bureaucracy created to manage varying parts of the overall 
security reform taken by the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s. Insistence to 
strengthen conventional military units led the MAAG to equipping and organizing South 
Vietnam’s Army into divisional structures using U.S. weapons gladly accepted by South 
Vietnamese counterparts. The equipping of the military carried over to police and 
paramilitary forces, such as the SDC and CG, as Diem placed them under military control 
against MSU police trainers’ advice, who advocated their placement under provincial, 
administrative authority.   
The Kennedy administration changed the source of support to counterinsurgent 
forces, insisting the military use U.S. Special Forces to train paramilitary and militia 
forces. Though Kennedy believed he was placing more emphasis on internal threats to 
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South Vietnam, it is clear that Eisenhower was equally concerned with subversive threats 
during his push for international police training to prevent communist influence in the 
Third World. What is attributable to both administrations is how their pacification 
policies to prevent communist aggression in Vietnam took a back seat to the conventional 
military effort.77  The fractured environment leftover from the French-Indochina War, 
Diem’s authoritative policies, and the U.S. strategic policy to bolster South Vietnam 
against further communist influence led to U.S. military intervention. The advisory 
period took the form of materiel and technical support, which drew from the conventional 
experience and resources used during the Second World War and Korea. As the 
insurgency grew, the advisory group grew with it, and the continued mirror imaging of its 
security forces. After the Diem and Kennedy assassinations in 1963, the path to complete 
U.S. intervention took shape as the South Vietnam security situation worsened and it 
became apparent that South Vietnam’s military would ultimately fail.  
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III. AFGHANISTAN: 2001–PRESENT 
George W. Bush came to office in 2000 on a foreign policy platform advocating 
against nation-building with little direction toward combating worldwide terror 
organizations.78  The Bush administration’s attention to counterterrorism quickly 
changed after the 9/11 attacks, leading a new era of conflict, with many old practices 
resurrected due to a lack of understanding of new strategies to combat the global reach of 
terrorist organizations. Nearly 15 years later, U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan, 
providing advisory support to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) as they fight 
off the Taliban’s attempts to reclaim territory.   
Tracing the dynamics of Afghanistan’s environment, U.S. doctrine, and 
technology will show how the small U.S. military footprint evolved since its intervention 
in Afghanistan. Unlike Vietnam, Afghanistan resulted from a terrorist attack on U.S. soil 
planned from within Afghanistan. U.S. military intervention led to a nation-building 
effort, followed by a COIN mission, to what today is a train, advise, and assist mission. 
The FSF built by the U.S. remains the same; an ANSF built in the image of the U.S. 
military. After establishing the historical context for the case, each factor will be 
discussed as it relates to building ANSF. Each factor will be discussed chronologically, 
followed by a conclusion showing how the factors create the casual mechanism for the 
U.S. military building mirror-image FSF inadequate for its operational environment.    
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 Afghanistan has long been known for its diverse tribal culture and difficult 
terrain, used over centuries to deflect foreign conquest. In 2001, the Taliban controlled 
most of the internationally recognized territory of Afghanistan, with a firm grip on the 
south. Predominantly comprised of Pashtuns, the Taliban came to power in the mid-
1990s after a bloody civil war with competing tribal factions, mostly in the North and 
West of the country. The regime used sharia law to quell opposition and enforce strict 
Islamist ideology against territory it controlled.    
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Introduction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and USSOF on the ground 
in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks presented a new look into how the U.S. waged war 
on its enemies. Small teams of highly specialized Soldiers, with the backing of superior 
U.S. airpower and a coalition of tribal militias were able to oust the Taliban regime in 
short order. However, the failure to close off the escape route to Pakistan ensured the 
Taliban’s opportunity for consolidation and a future insurgency to challenge the new 
Afghan government. The U.S/NATO coalition aimed to establish a new comprehensive 
Afghan government able to stabilize the region and deny Al-Qaeda with a safe haven to 
plan future terrorist plots. Pakistan agreed to assist U.S. efforts against the Taliban, 
however accommodating these requests proved difficult, owing much to Pakistan’s 
internal Taliban influence inside their country. The Waziristan region in Northwest 
Pakistan was easily accessible for the Afghan Taliban, and would be their refuge for 
escaping the slow grip of the U.S. security net aimed to catch Al Qaeda and Taliban 
remnants by December 2001.79   
The quick reaction of U.S. forces operating side by side with the Northern 
Alliance could be deemed solely a retributive response to attacks planned and carried out 
by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, supported and protected by the Taliban regime. Rebuilding 
the Afghan government was not considered a priority until December 2001; two months 
after the U.S. assault began. Initially, President Bush focused the U.S. response to 
disrupting Al Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan and attacking the Taliban regime, only to have 
this narrowed strategy broadened through the rapid military victory and subsequent 
administration officials outlining nation-building plans for Afghanistan.80   
B. ENVIRONMENT 
The initial UN resolution passed during the Bonn Conference in December 2001 
established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This force secured Kabul 
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and trained Afghan Security Forces, but restricted the force from operating outside the 
capital.81 From 2002 to 2005, the relative peace secured by the U.S. and its allies was 
more a testament to the Taliban taking time in Pakistan to regroup its personnel and raise 
money for a resurgence in Afghanistan than U.S. efforts in building the governance, 
security and economy. Hamid Karzai took charge of the new Afghan government, which 
used the Loya Jirga system to unite tribal leaders from across the country assembled like 
a legislative body to establish new laws. Though the Loya Jirga was able to pass a new 
constitution based off an earlier form of government prior to the Soviet and Civil Wars, it 
lacked the ability to project its legitimacy outside of Kabul.82 
Karzai co-opted warlords to support his interim government, mainly through 
appointments to varying leadership roles inside his government. Three decades of war 
left all institutions barely functioning, if at all. Additionally, the prolonged conflict in 
Afghanistan had destroyed almost every aspect of Afghan society. Literacy was among 
the lowest in the world and poverty was rampant with influential land owners, and militia 
warlords wielding the power in a fractured state. Labeling the environment as a “limited 
access order” society, Grissom describes how the isolated geography in Afghanistan has 
limited human interaction with vast parts of the country responsible for a decentralized 
power structure.83  These fractures ran along tribal separations overlaid, and dictated, by 
one of the most robust topographies in the world, missing only a large body of water 
within its land locked borders. The Pashtun dominated southern region had long 
influenced politics in Afghanistan with more fractured tribes, comprising of Uzbeks, 
Tajiks, Turkmens and more Pashtuns residing in the north.84  Rural areas, particularly in 
the Pashtun south were skeptical of Kabul governments, and had learned to distrust 
power structures emanating from the capital. A newly constituted government that had 
                                                 
81 Thomas X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Lessons 
Encountered: Learning from the Long War, eds. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, 
DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 278. 
82Collins, “Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 26 
83 Adam Grissom, “Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military 
Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001–2011,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, eds. Theo 
Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 273–274. 
84 Olivier Neola, “Building Security Institutions: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” Focus 
Strategique, no. 38 (July-August, 2012), 8.  
 34 
just overthrown the existing order with the help of a foreign military, needed to 
immediately provide basic security and extend its reach from Kabul to the outlying 
regions. 
The establishment of centralized government completely ignored realities on the 
ground, in favor of what the intervening authority, in this case the U.S. government, 
projected was in the best interests of Afghanistan. The warlords controlling regional areas 
were deemed inadequate for modernizing the state; therefore, central authority brought 
perceived order and legitimacy. Afghan opponents to centralized authority, like the one 
granted in Karzai’s constitution in 2004, felt they had a bad history of neglecting regions 
outside of Kabul.85   
Over the next 6 years, the inability of the central Kabul government to extend 
security to remote districts, provide essential services, like health care, and prevent the 
Taliban from staging an effective insurgency from neighboring Pakistan delegitimized 
Karzai and his government. Corruption played a strong role in the central government’s 
ineffective use of its ministries to ensure policy worked down to outlying districts. The 
lack of security left wide open seams for the Taliban to reestablish networks in southern 
and western Afghanistan. Helmand Province served as key terrain for its poppy 
production. The opium trade not only funded the Taliban, it helped corrupt officials at all 
levels of the newly constituted government.86   
As NATO and Afghan partners slowly increased its ability to project authority 
outside the capital, the Taliban were building shadow governments to fill the void left in 
adjudicating disputes after the Taliban’s overthrow four years earlier. The Taliban 
received training from Al Qaeda operatives with experience fighting the U.S. in Iraq, in 
employing improvised explosive devices against coalition forces.87  Violence continued 
over the next three years, targeting anyone not supporting the Taliban including coalition, 
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Afghan, and even non-governmental organization officials. The slow response from the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and NATO, coupled with a 
lack of manpower, failed to seize the initiative to build local institutions of authority. 
Though elections were successful in 2004, subsequent elections threatened by Taliban 
propaganda decreased public participation further alienating the Karzai government.   
After the U.S. surge in Afghanistan in 2009, a renewed effort began to link 
villages, through their districts and provinces to the national government. Village leaders 
were viewed as key for establishing partnerships between coalition and Afghan forces to 
win back rural territory that had been severely neglected by continuous coalition and 
GIRoA presence up to 2009. Gaining access to villages was seen as a necessary step to 
bring GIRoA representation to the people. After eight years of attempting to work from a 
national level to secure Afghanistan, the coalition was now turning to build partnerships 
from the ground up. The problems with implementing this strategy was the volume of 
locations involved. Of the 401 districts in Afghanistan, 94 designated “key terrain 
districts” and 44 labeled “areas of interest” proved an enormous effort that was met with 
a response of an increase from 300 to 1,000 U.S. government civilians from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development and the Departments of State, Justice and 
Agriculture.88 Some of these civilians worked in District Support Teams (DSTs) aimed at 
advising Afghan officials implement development projects and manage formal links to 
the village or community level. Though bold and aggressive, the initiatives presented 
through the surge to develop local governance sought to drastically alter historical 
administrative capacity. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s own sub-national governance policy 
mimicked the U.S ambitions for local governance to include “Justice…street lighting, 
recreational facilities, social protection, private sector development and health and 
nutrition,” among others, proving to be overly ambitious, and equally ridiculous.89  The 
unwarranted goals to build governance and development are an example of the 
misunderstanding of how a complex environment adapts due to external influence. 
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C. DOCTRINE 
The Bush Administration was split between the Department of State (DOS) and 
Department of Defense (DOD) on just how large the military presence should be after the 
Taliban was overthrown. Officials from DOD were advocating for an international 
peacekeeping force in Kabul, and DOS wanted to extend the peacekeeping force to 
several other population centers across the country with potential U.S. troop involvement. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld led the charge for a much smaller force aimed at 
hunting down remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. A small footprint strategy 
initially sought to capitalize on momentum gained by routing the Taliban from power, 
and implementing an interim government, with the backing of a new Afghan military.90  
Building the Afghan military would not only legitimize the new government, but secure 
the second objective of U.S. strategy, which was to prevent Al Qaeda from using any part 
of Afghanistan as a safe haven. Building the military was placed on hold, initially, to deal 
with the militias that SF and CIA teams had worked with since hitting the ground in 
October 2001. The U.S. led coalition decided to disband the militias and integrate them 
into a professionalized army. Professionalizing the military was viewed as a logical step 
for rebuilding a U.S. friendly Afghan nation. From 2002–2009, training of the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) comprised of training the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), while building the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) at the national level.   
Coalition partners separated responsibilities of Security Sector Reform (SSR), 
placing different countries in charge of different elements of the security institution. The 
U.S. directed ANA efforts, Germany directed the ANP, Great Britain led counternarcotic 
efforts, Italy took charge of justice reforms, and Japan took charge of disarmament, 
demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militias, primarily former members of 
the Northern Alliance.91  The U.S. initially placed SF units in charge of training Afghan 
Kandaks, the base Afghan military unit modeled after U.S. infantry battalions. Though 
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U.S. Central Command began assessing how their piece of SSR would unfold in 
February 2002, SF did not commence training the Army until May.92 As the violence 
reduced, and plans for the ANA became more formalized, training the new Afghan 
military became a U.S. conventional force responsibility. Major General Karl Eikenberry 
took command of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in October 
2002 and implemented plans to create the Army from the top down. Training efforts by 
SF to this point had been decentralized across the country, and in Eikenberry’s view, 
neglected the supporting functions of a national military including “a recruiting force, 
trainers, living facilities, equipment, and any form of logistics or personnel support.”93  
Aiding this view was the desire by some in both the conventional and special operations 
communities to remove SF from the training mission in order to continue 
counterterrorism operations against recently ousted Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliates.94  
SF, specially trained to train foreign militaries, would no longer play a role in building 
the ANA. Instead, a U.S. infantry BDE under the name Task Force Phoenix, would take 
over the training along with individuals provided by the Marine Corps, National Guard, 
and coalition partners. An ad hoc organization replaced the ad hoc nature SF originally 
set out to meet the U.S. mandate in building the national army.       
From 2002–2005, the establishment of the ANSF hit many obstacles, requiring 
adjustments by the U.S. led coalition as it moved along. A training academy established 
in Kabul comprised of U.S. trainers conducting initial training for all new recruits. 
Recruits faced learning impediments due to high levels of illiteracy. Even though many 
were former members of Northern Alliance militias, they were new to formalized 
military organization. Planning and maintenance skills suffered as U.S. Soldiers barely 
had enough recruits to fill the needed combat troop positions. By the summer of 2003, the 
U.S. and Afghan Interim Government decided to halt current training, and start fresh, 
building the MOD from the top down.95  At this point, the number of U.S. personnel 
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available to conduct the training in Afghanistan was severely limited by the plans to 
invade Iraq. By 2005, as Taliban activity increased, the output of Afghan Kandaks 
increased, but were limited by the failure to increase the trainers available. National 
Guard were filling the rolls of training, usually formed ad hoc stateside, provided limited 
training on advisory roles, before deploying to Afghanistan to train the ANA. U.S. 
trainers constantly adjusted ANA training, attempting to strike a balance between quality 
and quantity. The amount of time required to build efficient, quality troops was clearly 
unsustainable as the pace yielded too few troops available for combat. Additionally, 
deserters, attrition, and the end of initial enlistment periods affected Afghan troop levels. 
As the Taliban insurgency increased, the combat strain on Afghan Soldiers increased. 
Assigned to an operational Kandak once initial training was complete, Afghans in 
certain areas of operation would spend the next three years on the front lines, while their 
coalition advisors spent as few as four months before rotating with another coalition unit. 
This affected both unit morale on the Afghan side, and credibility and continuity on the 
advisor side. Embedded training teams provided Kandaks with U.S. advisors from initial 
training through operational deployment. The advisor teams, built in an ad hoc manner, 
placed advisor teams together in theater, neglecting them opportunities to build unit 
cohesion during pre-deployment training. Many advisors deployed as individual 
augmenters had little to no experience or training in advising FSF.   
In July 2005, OMC-A was renamed the Office of Security Cooperation-
Afghanistan, and took control of ANA and ANP training, then renamed again less than a 
year later to Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to 
incorporate the MOD and MOI.96  The German approach focused training ANP officers 
and NCOs, but not patrolmen. Contractors helped fill the gap, employing DynCorp 
trainers to ANP units in the field, as well as MOI in Kabul to improve professionalism 
and accountability.97  TF Phoenix had similarly employed contractors in Kabul in 2003 
to address professionalizing the MOD officials in Kabul. Prior to the military taking over 
training for the ANP, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
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Enforcement Affairs took the lead, but suffered from manning and budgetary shortfalls 
leaving the ANP well short of projected strengths planned for 2005. Additionally, placing 
the ANA and ANP training under one command streamlined coordination and 
implementation of reforms previously thwarted by interagency, bureaucratic problems. 
Between 2005 and 2007, the resurgent Taliban presence prompted the coalition to 
rapidly increase efforts in supporting ANA training and capabilities. Quality was 
sacrificed for quantity, as the training Academy in Kabul cut initial training from a 14 to 
10 week course, increasing the number of Afghan soldiers produced a year to catch up to 
allotted end strengths. The ANA end strength of 70,000 established in December 2002 
did not change until 2008, when it increased to 86,000 in February, then again to 134,000 
in August.98  The rapid increase in end strength totals focused CSTC-A trainers on 
fielding infantry units to meet the goal, sacrificing enabling and sustainment units. This 
ensured that U.S. support would be closely linked to the success of the ANA against a 
steadily growing insurgency in the south and east. Fires, intelligence, logistics, and 
survivability were heavily supported through U.S. and coalition units to make up for the 
lack of internal Afghan capability. The need to have Afghans at the front of the fight 
against a growing insurgency was seen as the most important aspect of military 
operations, rather than building a military that could meet all elements of combat power. 
By mid-2009, NATO established the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), 
with contributors from 37 nations to assist the U.S. mission in building additional 
security forces, with the commander of CSTC-A simultaneously commanding NTM-A.99   
U.S. forces gradually increased its footprint throughout 2008 into 2009. Since 
2002, U.S. conventional forces were primarily operating in the east, a coalition led by 
Canada and Great Britain operated in the south and west, and USSOF operated over the 
entire country hunting Taliban and Al Qaeda wherever they could find them. However, as 
the insurgency grew in the south, the U.S. footprint increased to fill holes in between 
Kandahar and Helmand Province to the west. In March 2009, General Stanley 
McChrystal, newly appointed as ISAF commander responsible for administering the 
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recently approved surge by President Obama in his first year of office, ridiculed efforts in 
Afghanistan to date because of its lack of focus on the population. A former commander 
of Joint Special Operations Command, and veteran of Iraq, he saw the population as the 
center of gravity largely ignored to this point. In McChrystal’s vision, the focus on 
building a conventional Afghan Army should not be the only initiative sought by the U.S. 
to fight the insurgency. Critics contend McChrystal went too far in his attempts to 
prevent civilian casualties, taking initiative out of the hands of the military and creating 
an environmental easily exploited by the Taliban.100  Regardless, the additional troops 
approved for his plan was handed to General Petraeus, his successor, who emphasized the 
need to balance securing the population and hunting the enemy.     
The ANA and ANP’s lack of success in rural Afghanistan, led the U.S., in 
coordination with the MOI, to create the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP) in 
Wardak province in March 2009.101  Later in June, USSOF continued to explore local 
defense in different provinces, looking to take the Sons of Iraq model to Afghanistan. 
Using local powerbrokers, willing to aid special operations in fighting against the 
insurgents, U.S. SOF would provide materiel and training for locally backed fighters to 
defend themselves, rather than look for protection from a coalition and Afghan military 
unable to hold ground across the country. USSOF named it the Local Defense Initiative 
(LDI), but did not seek MOI approval as was the case for the APPP. Renaming the 
USSOF role to Village Stability Operations (VSO) was meant to ease concerns 
emanating from the U.S. embassy and MOI about these local forces turning into militias. 
VSO was meant to be a robust initiative, not only to build local security, but to improve 
governance and economic activity, thought to be underlying causes for insurgent 
strongholds in less developed, rural pockets, where the insurgent support base was 
thought to live. MOI took control of local security forces as VSO educated coalition and 
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Afghan leaders alike, and by August 2010, President Karzai authorized the Afghan Local 
Police (ALP).102   
The initial mandate for the ALP differed from the Afghan Uniformed Police 
(AUP) in that they were a fraction of AUP salaries, because ALP was part-time. 
Recruited from their home villages, ALP served in a defensive manner, protecting against 
Taliban intimidation and influence. Selected and approved for training by the village 
elders in a village, USSOF trained ALP for 2–3 weeks in basic patrolling and policing 
techniques, even though they were never given arrest authority, but trained to work with 
their local ANP counterparts to exchange detainees to ANP authoritative control. Rule of 
law was stressed throughout training to ensure the ALP would not revert back to 
retributive techniques that had been associated with Afghan militias during the previous 
three decades. Uniforms were provided to the ALP to both distinguish them as an official 
security force and to legitimize the district, provincial, and even national government for 
providing the means for the village to protect itself.    
Tactically, the ALP served as intelligence sensors for USSOF and partnered 
Afghan forces. A district AUP Deputy Chief of Police was directed as District ALP 
Commander for whom all village ALP commanders answered. As more villages 
requested their own ALP programs, USSOF turned to area control of multiple programs 
at one time. In late 2012, Arghandab District in Kandahar Province alone had 30 villages 
with nearly 400 ALP members, advised by one Special Forces Operational Detachment-
Alpha.103  Conveniently located outside Kandahar City, Arghandab faced fewer 
challenges than remote outposts severed by poor roads and increasingly rugged terrain, 
complicating logistics pushes and ALP salary payments delivered in cash. The ALP often 
emulated their AUP counterparts, building checkpoints as static defensive locations, 
where ALP would congregate. Though trained to patrol their villages day and night with 
issued Ak-47s, it was common to find all members of the ALP sleeping, eating, or just 
sitting around their makeshift checkpoint. ALP checkpoints were built using materials 
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acquired from USSOF teams and normally located checkpoints at the village ALP 
Commander’s home inside the village, rather than more tactically sufficient locations.   
President Obama’s decision to surge troops in 2009, caused a ripple effect in how 
transition occurred. Effects based transition was permitted within this period for some 
situations, like Arghandab, but in most cases were forced to turn to time-based effects. 
Meeting the U.S. policy objective for an end of the U.S. combat role by 2014 altered 
measures of progress in order to “transition” rather than “abandon” partner forces. As 
fewer units deployed beginning in 2013, to replace what was on the ground, 
consolidation of ANSF to compliment the reduction of U.S. partnered forces were 
necessary. Operations planned and led by Afghan officers increased, as the U.S. 
increasingly took a partnered stance further away from actions on the objective. USSOF 
teams transitioned to tactical over watch (TOW) of ALP districts, moving to larger 
coalition bases and reducing the amount of face-to-face engagements during combat 
rotations. This posture forced U.S. partners to ensure Afghan partners that U.S. support 
would continue on a more limited basis, and that the systems emplaced to support 
security forces, such as the ALP, would have to be used moving forward. The ALP had 
relied on the District ALP Commander for sustainment, and he up through the provincial 
ANP structure to the national level MOI continuing the formalized bottom-up, top-down 
strategy envisioned by President Obama’s surge at the beginning of 2009.   
D. TECHNOLOGY 
Initially, the decision to equip new ANSF with Warsaw Pact weapon systems 
including the Ak-47 rifle and PKM machine guns necessitated a viable source. Donor 
supplies from neighboring countries, weapons acquired from DDR of former militias, and 
former Taliban stockpiles provided initial sources. The serviceability and quality of many 
of these weapons were miserable contributing to poor effectiveness and low morale. 
During the surge in 2009, the U.S. began to equip the Afghans with Western weapons, 
such as the M-16, which requires much more care and maintenance than the AK-47 rifle. 
According to a Washington Post article, pressure from former Afghan defense minister 
Abdul Rahim Wardak influenced this decision as he “argued to Pentagon officials and 
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members of Congress that American weapons would make his army appear more 
professional.”104  Wardak did not stop with American rifles, calling for the U.S. to arm 
his military with F-16 fighter jets and M-1 tanks; tools of conventional warfare aimed at 
deterring neighboring armies, as opposed to effective tools to combat a raging 
insurgency.   
Other U.S. and coalition practices adapted by the Afghans should have been 
ignored. Once large conventional forces entered Afghanistan for combat operations or as 
part of the advisory effort to build ANSF, large bases were built to support and sustain 
these forces. Kandahar and Bagram Airfields were two main hubs of coalition support 
serving the eastern and southern regions, and in 2008, expansion of Camp Bastion in 
Helmand Province significantly increased the capacity to house U.S. troops leading the 
surge in 2009.105  Afghan partners readily accepting U.S. supplied headquarters to build 
static positions away from the populations they meant to protect. Copying these 
inadequate dispositions for COIN operations continued the alienation between ANSF and 
the populous. When Afghan units deployed to remote areas, they lacked internal 
sustainment capabilities, such as lift assets to carry resupply to these isolated areas, and 
depended heavily on coalition support to extend the capability. 
Funding the military will continue to drive operations the U.S. military conduct. 
Plans for the troop surge were met with plans to build an ANSF force totaling 300,000 
personnel. Projected costs, just to sustain the level advocated by Washington would be 
$4.1 billion a year, which at the time was over double the annual Afghan government 
revenue.106  Additional to concerns over sustaining ANSF financially, coalition advisors 
had to account for the manner in which they transitioned ANSF to independent 
operations. This had residual effects, in that the highly technologically based coalition 
advisors, especially USSOF advisors, had to wean partnered Afghans from supporting 
platforms that would no longer exist after the combat mission ended in 2014. Unmanned 
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Ariel Vehicles (UAVs) used for ISR would be drastically reduced in theater, as well as 
fire support platforms used by coalition advisors during the beginning of the surge. 
Understanding the need for the Afghans to maintain momentum as surge forces drew 
down, advisors created avenues for the Afghans to manage and collect internal 
intelligence with their own assets, much that would be face to face, rather than using 
technical capabilities that would no longer be available.107 
E. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. intervention was a response to an attack on American soil, planned by 
Al Qaeda from its safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. A single terrorist act 
killed thousands of U.S. citizens and struck symbols of U.S. military and financial power, 
thrusting the U.S. into its longest war. Prior to examining the true history and societal 
structure in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration made the undeniably simple choice to 
attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime seeking retribution. Successfully accomplishing 
initial objectives, and with minimal efforts and assets, the Bush Administration was 
emboldened by the prospect that so much could be accomplished by so little in such a 
short time. The prolonged military intervention that followed failed to maintain the 
initiative. Instead of keeping limited objectives concrete with the dismantling of the 
Taliban regime and disruption of a global terrorist network, a costly nation-building 
struggle commenced. The same strategy President Bush campaigned he would avoid just 
over a year earlier.   
Afghanistan is a perfect example of a failed state. A civil war between the 
Taliban, controlling most of the country and the Northern Alliance had been waged since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade earlier. Ethnic diversity, religious 
extremism, and unclear regional alliances make Afghanistan one of the most socially 
diverse countries on Earth. Couple this with its landlocked borders and physical diversity 
ranging from barren dessert to frigid, mountainous terrain, Afghanistan is one of the most 
inhospitable countries a military can operate. Underlying the inadequacy of the U.S. to 
comprehend the resources it was about to expend attempting to modernize such a remote 
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location is the fact that the Soviets provided a partial glimpse at the result of intervention 
11 years prior to the U.S. attempt. 
U.S. military doctrine is prefaced by the belief and culture that its force is capable 
of any mission. A track record in conventional warfare backs up the claim, but when this 
type of war comes to locations like Afghanistan, it fails to adjust in a timely manner. U.S. 
military members will always fight as they are trained, and train as they fight. The 
attrition based warfare again took over strategy, as SOF units were pulled from any 
training or development of ANSF in favor of kill and capture missions aimed at Al Qaeda 
and Taliban leadership. In its vacuum conventional forces were used to train former 
militia members, unable to read and write in most cases, to become professional soldiers. 
U.S./NATO created cumbersome command relationships as the coalition figured out the 
interaction of varying countries, with varying national caveats, while planning and 
executing combat operations and SFA operations. Another war took U.S. focus away 
from Afghanistan only to “surge” military and government civilians back into the 
environment after the insurgency increased over a four-year period attempting a last ditch 
effort before U.S. policy mandated U.S. combat ending in Afghanistan.   
Finally, the sustainment capabilities, which plagued Afghan dependence on U.S. 
coalition support, continue to anchor U.S. technical expertise to ANSF effectiveness. 
Financial support will continue to be subsidized by sponsors or donors in order to 
maintain and build ANSF personnel, equipment, and supply. Once again, the U.S. 
military has anchored itself to a force of its own creation that cannot survive without 
consistent inputs of materiel support into its security institution.   
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IV. THE FUTURE OF BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 
Analyzing the factors of EDT in the above case studies has helped to underline 
the problems the U.S. currently has in building partner capacity. The first step in 
understanding a problem is to establish that a problem exists. The U.S. is currently 
expanding its assistance to Iraqi Security Forces in its fight against ISIS. Building Partner 
Capacity including the security institutions around the globe will remain a priority in U.S. 
government foreign policy in the immediate future. Failing to adjust patterns in building 
the wrong security required for different operational environments will continue to 
impede U.S. foreign policy goals and continue to waste valuable resources unnecessarily. 
This chapter will discuss the findings examined in EDT factors for each case study 
followed by recommendations for SFA policy and further research to test the theory built 
in this study.    
A. FINDINGS 
U.S. interventions around the world after the Second World War have sought to 
build capacity of viable partners who can share the burden in global security. The 
competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War led to proxy 
wars around the Third World in a competition between political ideologies. Since the end 
of the Cold War, the old proxy wars turned to security assistance operations in weakened 
states, ranging from ensuring humanitarian aid delivery to hungry Somalians to fighting 
the Global War on Terror after 9/11. The impacts of these security assistance efforts have 
not always reached an acceptable outcome, which leads to questions over the manner that 
U.S. provides aid to partners, in particular, military aid. Focusing on the military aid 
mission provided to build the capacity of FSF has been the focus, because, “these 
activities are increasingly enshrined in doctrine,” as Reveron states.108  The COIN 
doctrine revised during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2006 is a testament to rethinking 
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doctrine, however it still fails to alter strategy aimed to secure areas governed by weak 
power structures. 
In both cases, initial strategies evolved into wide spread military intervention, 
then into a locked commitment fighting insurgencies over years. Additionally, the FSF 
built from U.S. efforts severely lacked institutional strength to operate in the image the 
U.S. military has spent over a century building for itself. The interaction of the social and 
political dynamics, and the repeated failure of U.S. officials, both military and civilian, to 
empathize with those dynamics support the theory that the U.S. will default to ignoring 
realities on the ground, and apply the known U.S. model even when it does not 
effectively increase the capabilities of host nation security. The lack of U.S. enablers to 
comprehend their environment further deteriorates in weak states after it is determined 
that partnered forces are not proceeding at the pace desired by policy makers and military 
strategists, choosing to apply U.S. military force. This represents a “new normal” that pits 
the large, bureaucratic institutions of U.S. government and the doctrine it is accustomed 
to following to environments that are ill suited for such activity. The lack of resources 
and institutional knowledge creates a gap between local institutional expectations and 
U.S. performance expectations. The hope in filling this gap is through materiel, military 
aid and accompanying military expertise, leading to a massive equipping effort. The 
belief that improving the armament and mobility of partner security forces as paramount, 
echoes Weigley’s argument that military strategy reverts to historic conceptions of 
destroying enemy forces; strategy at odds with “limited war.”109  Analyzing how the U.S. 
and Government of Vietnam acted during the Vietnam War, R.W. Komer pins blame on 
institutional factors of both governments applying solutions designed for different threats 
then the ones they faced.110  However, there is no evidence that the issues found to 
contribute to failures in Vietnam have adequately been addressed, leaving us with another 
example of similar shortcomings in Afghanistan. 
This research proposes the argument that current methods in building partner 
capacity in failed states are inadequate due to the interaction of environmental, doctrinal 
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and technological factors. EDT theory proposes that a failure to apply local realities into 
a new doctrine for unconventional conflicts leads to U.S. mirror imaging its security 
structure inappropriately to partner forces. Without a strong foundation, no strategy can 
win if the people are not committed to execute reforms aimed at securing themselves. 
The U.S. repeatedly attempts to motivate foreign audiences to meet this requirement 
through military materiel and advisor assistance with varying results. Further research is 
required to test the EDT theory. In both cases, U.S. conventional forces deployed to train 
FSF, and conduct offensive operations against adversarial forces. However, conventional 
forces exist to win the nation’s wars through offensive operations, rather than build 
partner capacity. Building FSF for internal security was required in South Vietnam and 
Afghanistan. Special Forces are specially trained and selected soldiers able to conduct 
FID. The reality that SF did not deploy to South Vietnam to conduct COIN until 1961 is a 
testament to inappropriate doctrine applied. Likewise, the introduction of conventional 
forces to take over training of ANSF, and place SF on terrorist hunting missions after the 
Taliban regime was defeated, echoed the U.S. military’s consistent preference for 
attrition based, offensive operations.      
Professionalizing FSF is more than training tactics and handing out rifles, tanks 
and uniforms. Bengt Abrahamsson defines the military profession “as a corps of 
specialized experts in the management of violence.”111  Military professionals are 
expected to study, learn, and employ a common standard of tactics and doctrine with the 
materiel provided by their governing state. Additionally, ethical standards and codes of 
conduct help members relate to the organization’s purpose and build cohesion, so the 
many of its parts function as a whole to win the nation’s wars. This broadly summarizes 
the U.S. concept of military organization and culture. The U.S. has a long history of 
attrition based warfare, where technological advances in weaponry and mastery of 
battlefield tactics helps shape our notions on how to wage war. The Second World War 
was a testament to U.S. industrial might and collective national will built since the U.S. 
founding. The Cold War that followed brought about new threats of subversion and 
limited war theory. Weaker actors with less materiel at their disposal challenged colonial 
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powers of authority with their own nationalist fervor, seeking to maximize their ability to 
innovate and exploit weaknesses of greater military powers through maneuver. Edward 
Luttwak theorized that militaries, which approached war through attrition are more 
focused on inward processes and perfecting the parts of its organization.112  This inward 
focus neglects the external environment, which is the strength of insurgents who must 
adhere to maneuver over attrition to survive, because they are outgunned and 
overmatched technologically.   
The means of war have become less and less important for the survival of non-
state actors. Their ability to find sanctuary and exploit territorial seams is a weakness 
Western militaries have repeatedly fallen prey to, and are now highlighted as models for 
future NSAs bent on challenging attrition based militaries. Weakened states are 
susceptible to exploitation by NSAs in areas where they cannot project security. 
Institutions are necessary for states to manage the people, materiel, and resources 
comprising their security apparatus, including police and military. This internal security 
threat appears to be the environment of choice for U.S. military intervention, when the 
option is chosen. Arguments vary over how the U.S., or if the U.S. should respond to 
these weakened states when U.S. strategic interests are at risk. The argument for building 
local security institutions is an argument that has been put forward due to recent 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq failing to reach definitive and positive results. 
However, as both case studies show, the U.S. military’s attempt to build local forces, the 
CG/SDC in Vietnam and ALP in Afghanistan, are inappropriately implemented and 
managed by U.S. military officers. The military bureaucracy has not changed its 
organizational and cultural understandings of the American way of war since the Second 
World War. This prevents a wide enough audience in the military hierarchy to understand 
the need to apply varying solutions to varying environments. Introducing U.S. 
conventional brigade units or creating ad hoc organizations from the national guard to 
train FSF in the U.S. image are likely to fail where ideas of nationalism vary broadly 
across a diverse population.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS    
The following recommendations are plausible conclusions I have derived from 
inductive analysis of the case studies presented. Further research is required to test the 
validity of these findings. As of this writing, nearly 10,000 U.S. military personnel are 
involved with the advise and assist mission in Afghanistan, Operation Resolute Hope. 
Regardless how the security situation unfolds as Afghans continue to control their own 
security, it is strongly apparent that without U.S. advisors and financial support, ANSF 
will collapse. Further research on EDT need to test the factors discussed against a broader 
range of U.S. interventions in the post-Cold War era. The theory should work to explain 
other cases where U.S. trained security forces modeled inappropriately for their 
environment. Additionally, local security institutions and programs supported by the U.S. 
military such as the Sons of Iraq and VSO could provide substance to EDT theory. The 
continued use of Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan, and how they evolve over time 
may provide further insights to effective means of securing local populations. 
Few arguments will declare the need for the U.S. government to reframe its 
nation-building strategy in failed states, however the train, advise and assist methods 
should be relooked under the BPC umbrella. The natural tendency of the military 
enterprise when tasked to assist foreign militaries is to teach what the advisor knows. 
However, as this research has pointed out, the knowledge passed to FSF is not adequate 
for fighting insurgencies. Common characteristics between Vietnam and Afghanistan 
were the introduction of advisors who knew little about their operational environment. 
When the need to build a partner’s capacity arises, the U.S. military needs to have 
personnel qualified to work in the type of environments these missions have trended to 
take place since the Second World War. These environments have fractured populations 
along political, cultural or ethnic lines, and decentralizing power bases. The military 
should not attempt to take General Purpose Forces (GPF) trained, organized and 
equipped for conventional warfare to take on this mission. Fractured environments in 
failing states require individuals who can adapt to their environment rather than working 
to change the environment to match its capability. GPF are built for, and should remain 
ready to defend the nation against adversarial armies. USSOF are specially selected and 
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trained forces capable of working in fluid environments of fragile states and are adept in 
building and maintaining relationships. However, USSOF is not an easy button, and their 
size limits the effective employment of a sole Special Operations Task Force in the 
number of theaters requiring a USSOF capable partnership. This generates the need to 
redefine what stability is and the components required to establish it in failed states. 
Future research examining militia style security institutions in Africa could provide 
another set of case studies with fractured social environments with poor national 
institutional capacity.    
The long-term effort of building secure environments in failed states should 
always assume to need an extensive timeline for the differences between members of its 
society to negotiate terms of cooperation. GPF require a large footprint to sustain its 
forces, which provides a target rich environment to adversaries against development of 
state institutions. USSOF can provide the smaller footprint that can blend into 
environments and implement plans for external support to decrease their vulnerability. 
Failed states tend to be within range of neighboring, permissive states where additional 
assets, such as air bases may be used for the insertion of quick reaction forces. Where this 
isn’t possible, such as Afghanistan, basing should be kept at the very minimum required 
to maintain adequate coverage. Any location where forces could not receive such support 
shouldn’t be options for GPF or USSOF.   
Doctrine is a mechanism for which all elements inside an organization can 
maintain standards required to achieve combined success among the organization’s parts. 
Large bureaucratic organizations like the U.S. military are designs created over centuries 
of combat experience. Doctrinal change is not required to deal with NSA threats in 
failing states, but recognition of what military doctrine is capable and incapable of doing 
will increase its effectiveness by preventing its misapplication in environments it was 
never intended to go. The U.S. military is capable of working in failed states, but the 
political appetite has soured over sustained combat in theaters overseas. Popular support 
dissents when military intervention extends beyond progress. Vietnam was of little 
concern to U.S. citizens when the MAAG was advising Diem and his regime. After the 
introduction of ground combat forces took over media headlines a decade later, and U.S. 
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casualties filled headlines, the citizenry paid attention and eventually turned unpopular. 
The U.S. currently recognizes similar dissatisfaction with the prolonged effort in 
Afghanistan, however support currently exists in the USSOF centric manner President 
Obama is dealing with ISIS. As the situation progresses in Iraq, the partnership between 
USSOF and the Peshmerga in northern Iraq can provide a current case study to test new 
doctrine in USSOF centric footprints. The amount of time, resources, and effort the U.S. 
continues to provide Iraq with combating ISIS will continue to affect U.S. domestic 
support, as well as Iraqi support for continued U.S. intervention. These external and 
internal environmental considerations could observe the impact on the doctrine 
implemented by the U.S. dependent on the success of future military operations, such as 
reclaiming lost territory inside Iraq from ISIS.     
Technology imposes heavy demands upon partners. Equipping unproven fighters 
with complex armaments requiring layers of additional support, e.g., mechanics, 
armorers, engineers, and other skilled talent, will need external support to survive. U.S. 
officials responsible for decisions on equipping partners must consider the sustainment 
requirement, as well as other implications of U.S. military aid. One implication is the 
manipulation of foreign partners who will exploit the situation to empower their own 
position. Diem rejected U.S. advisors for suggesting he implement democratic reforms to 
his government, but accepted the U.S. partnership as the means to equip his military and 
police forces. The U.S. has a poor record of accomplishment in assessing the needs of 
security partners, often acting gullible to the requests of officials who have ulterior 
motives of security, such as Wardak in Afghanistan believing Western materiel makes 
Afghan forces appear more professional.  Materiel should be organic and locally 
procured. USSOF are and should continue training in innovative techniques using 
resources available to the environment to equip partner forces. At the very least, the U.S. 
requires a rigid examination of how it distributes military aid in failing states. Shipping 
containers full of armaments provided to groups who have never used the materiel will 
only lead to a continuous cycle of U.S. dependency and stall internal innovation. Analysis 
on the effects of U.S. military aid to countries across the globe are required. Statistical 
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analysis testing the relative security levels in countries receiving the most military 
financial and materiel aid to increase FSF effectiveness might provide this insight.    
The interaction between the environment, doctrine, and technology used in failing 
states must always drive a tailored response aimed to address issues of a particular 
operational environment. Predictable responses will thwart the innovation of the people 
we intend to support, and eventually lead to a security apparatus that is standing on 
external foundations of U.S. support, rather than the stronger foundations of internal 
resourcing and collective cooperation. Every effort facilitating cooperation at the most 
local level possible to achieve populous support can increase effectiveness. This option 
may require the U.S. to pass on intervention, opting for partners to look through their 
own mirror.  
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